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From Comparative Risk to Decision Analysis:
Ranking Solutions to Multiple-Value
Environmental Problems*
-John Kadvany**
Science begins and ends with problems.'
Karl Popper
Priority-Setting As a Problem
Environmentalists,- regulators, industry personnel and concerned
citizens have a basic interest in how to set or negotiate environmental
priorities given limited and possibly changing resources. Problems
include selecting wetlands for costly and uncertain restoration projects,
cleaning up hazardous waste sites to various land use standards or
earmarking funds for pollution prevention. They are partly technical or
scientific in that solutions require some knowledge of the physical,
biological or social conditions associated with various risks. They are
also normative in that decision makers must address what should be
done with available or additional resources - or what should be
delayed or not done at all.
A challenge of environmental priority-setting is not only of ranking
risks, but also solutions to risk problems. Even a single type of
problem, such as remediating hazardous waste sites, has multiple values
associated with it such as human health risk, ecological risk or
groundwater contamination (considered as a natural resource); a variety
of socioeconomic impacts such as property transfer or environmental
* For encouragement and comments, I thank Christina Chociolko, Baruch
Fischhoff, Karen Jenni, Paul Slovic and two reviewers. Bill Soo Hoo, Jeff Wong, Kimi
Klein, Lee Merkhofer, Karen Wong and Antje Kann made essential contributions to
the case study described below.
Dr. Kadvany is a Senior Manager at Applied Decision Analysis, Inc. in Menlo
Park, California. He received his Ph.D. from the Group in Logic and the
Methodology of Science at the University of California, Berkeley.
1 Quoted in Imre Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical
Discovery 5 (1976).
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equity; and costs such as that of restoring wetlands. Priority-setting
entails trade offs among these competing values when resources are
inadequate to do everything; resource consumption demands prudence,
or additional resources require negotiation.
"Values" refer here to why we are more supportive of certain
decision outcomes than others or what we care about, e.g., human
health and safety, ecological quality, the quality and extent of natural
resources, aesthetic values such as visibility and economic impacts. Yet,
values take on significance only within a decision-making context;
without the need to choose or prioritize actions, values have little
meaning. Conversely, any approach to value modeling that does not
help you decide what to do is seriously deficient.
Ranking risks (problems), is obviously part of ranking solutions: You
cannot assess the adequacy of alternative solutions without
understanding the problem they are intended to address.
Comparative Risk
Consider the approach of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to ranking environmental problems. This arose after its
1987 study, Unfinished Business, concluded that environmental policy
was often guided too much by public and political perceptions that
poorly correlated with risk levels and that social resources were not
being allocated to reduce health and environmental risk most
effectively. This then led to 1990 EPA Science Advisory Board (SAB)
efforts to, e.g.:2
2 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Unfinished Business: A
Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems (1987), Reducing Risk- Setting
Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection (and appendices, 1990); and A
Guidebook to Comparing Risks and Setting Environmental Priorities (1993). Several
of ten recommendations of Reducing Risk, at 6, imply that more is needed than
rankinq problems, bear repeating:
. EPA should target its environmental protection efforts on the basis of
opportunities for the greatest risk reduction....
4. EPA should reflect risk-based priorities in its strategic planning
rocess.
. EPA should reflect risk-based priorities in its budget process....
'7. EPA should emphasize pollution prevention as the preferred option
for reducing risk.
8. EPA sliould increase its efforts to integrate environmental
considerations into broader aspects of public policy in as fundamental a
manner as are economic concerns ...
10.EPA should develop improved analytical methods to value natural
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1. base rankings on the best available knowledge while
reflecting uncertainties;
2. address environmental (i.e. ecological and natural
resource) as well as health impacts;
3. consider the social and economic impacts associated
with different risks;
4. make explicit the connections between technical
knowledge and value-laden policy judgments;
5. provide means for addressing views of multiple
stakeholders; and
6. consider solutions such as pollution prevention as well
as more traditional approaches.
Since at least then, the comparison of multiple value outcomes has
been part of EPA's agenda, as was the intention to somehow dovetail
solutions with risk problems. While neither the original SAB reports nor
subsequent EPA materials on comparative risk created a complete
approach to risk and solution rankings, the pieces of the puzzle were
articulated and their combined importance for policy recognized. In
particular, the straightforward idea of generating policy
recommendations by looking at solutions and their costs, in tandem
with problems, was there. EPA's comparative risk paradigm has resulted
in over a dozen completed ranking projects in Vermont, California,
Washington, Colorado and other states. 3 Over twenty further
projects, sometimes involving dozens of participants, are underway or
planned as of mid-1995. These projects represent one of EPA's most
sustained efforts in public participation and policy-setting. The largest,
such as the California project completed in 1994, cost nearly $1M. Yet,
while these comparative risk projects have allowed EPA to better
incorporate values and tradeoffs in setting policy, the original goals set
out in 1990 have been only partially achieved, and some have
apparently been forgotten.
Let's briefly evaluate some of the strengths and weaknesses of its
comparative risk projects. Identifying and characterizing uncertainties
may be the most successful aspect of most of them. For example,
although using a somewhat ambiguous "high," "medium," "low"
resources and to account for long-term environmental effects in its
economic analyses.
3 See Comparative Risk Bulletin (Northeast Center for Comparative Risk)
(July/August 1995), at 7-9.
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classification, the California project provided "level of confidence"
judgments with detailed descriptions for about two dozen health
hazard sources and structured likelihood judgments for dozens of
ecological exposure routes.
Competing sources of value, typically those of health, environment
and social welfare are also identified and individually ranked in several
projects. Unfortunately, the meaning of these multiple rankings and
their comparative analysis is relatively informal and has not proven
compelling. For example, the integrated rankings of the Vermont
study do not appear to be definable independently of participants'
judgments at ranking sessions, and the whole dimension of value is
discussed largely as a personal and subjective matter that apparently
could not be articulated with adequate definiteness. 4
As in the original SAB report, the term "importance" is used as a
proxy in several reports for more careful conceptions of value. Also, in
many cases, while the right issues such as the extent of health risk,
relative harm and populations of concern (e.g., children versus
adults)5 have been raised, the ambiguities of the term "importance"
make it almost impossible to disentangle technical and value
judgments, or to determine just what value judgments were intended.
There has also been little development of measurement scales used
to rank risks. For example, the Vermont "quality of life" scale and the
California "social welfare" scale combine attributes as disparate as
aesthetics, economic well-being, peace of mind, fairness, future
generations, recreation and sense of community. Combining all these
dimensions without some further structure makes it difficult to know
what such scales are intended to represent, and the ultimate policy
influence that such rankings could have is diminished.
Stakeholders have had many opportunities to participate, and the
projects represent one of EPA's most successful efforts in public
participation to date. Yet, the public and other stakeholders typically
have had few opportunities to define the environmental problems
considered, include new value categories or consider novel solutions to
4 See Environment 1991: Risks to Vermont and Vermonters (State of Vermont)
(1991) at 15.
5 For examples of "importance" see Environment 1991 supra at 15 and Reducing
Risk, supra note 2, at 17. See also infia note 26 and associated text.
Kadvany From Comparative Risk to Decision Analysis 337
risk problems. In the Vermont report, for example, it was concluded
that the problem of "people and their consumption of resources pose
the greatest risk to Vermont and Vermonters." However, this was not
officially part of the analysis: The greatest risk was "considered" but
"not ranked"!6 As "overconsumption" was relegated to ambiguous
status in the Vermont report, the 1994 California report treats
economics and environmental justice on tracks parallel to the apparently
more "official" rankings of health, ecology and social welfare. 7
A stumbling block in comparative risk appears to be at the step of
creating an integrated ranking of risks, or in the explicit treatment of
multiple and competing values. Some projects stop short at an
integrated ranking (e.g., California), but, when integrated rankings are
created, the logic tends to be ad hoc and largely intractable. Thus, it
would be difficult to obtain a clear answer to the question, "Well, what
do you mean by saying you 'considered human health risk and
ecological risk to be equally important'?" 8 Such approaches are a
consequence of EPA's offering little cogent advice in comparative risk
documents to explain what integrated rankings should represent and
how they should be constructed.
Moreover, as Baruch Fischhoff asked recently, "What can one do
with a risks ranking?" 9 From the perspective of action, risk ranking
produces a "worst-first" list and imply that one should first address
top-ranked risks. Still, if one of your top-ranked risks is global
warming, as in the Vermont report, should Vermont pursue that to the
exclusion of all others until it's fixed? By leaving out EPA's original
intention to consider solutions in tandem with problems, a risk ranking
6 See Environment 1991 supra note 4, at 3, 36.
7 Importantly, all the reports are neither one-sided in defining what "really" is a
problem nor in sharply segregating problems from solutions. The 1990 Washington
State report, for exampie, proactively defines priorities for pollution prevention and
other actions, and has been used to help develop state legislation. See Toward 2010:
An Environmental Action Agenda (State of Washington) (1990).
8 See Reducing Risk supra note 2 at 6: "EPA should attach as much importance
to reducing ecological risk as it does to reducing human health risk."
9 Baruch Fischhoff, Ranking Risks, 6 Risk 191, 201(1995). Note also the advice of
the National Research Council, Improving Risk Communication, 174-175 (1989)
that risk comparisons can help us understand likelihoods, gauge the relative
importance of different causes o the same hazard and help compare available options.
Comparative risk has largely excluded the third goal.
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may also fail to identify causes that can lead to effective risk reduction.
Also, because "problem rankings" serve no traditional scientific goal, it's
unclear who is served by the process.
In summary, comparative risk generally does much better with
treating uncertainty and codifying scientific information with which
EPA and its affiliates are familiar, as opposed to incorporating values -
probably because of the central role of uncertainty in risk assessment.
Comparative risk is well-motivated by the introduction of the issues
and structure defined by the SAB in 1990, as reflected in projects'
multiple rankings and the use of stakeholder input. However, once
critical problems are raised, i.e., comparing multiple and competing
values and how a ranking is to be used, the method fails to provide
substantive guidance.
Project and EPA documentation incorrectly suggest that this is the
best that could be done with current knowledge about integrating
science and values. Thus, comparative risk has been largely self-limited
to ranking problems and generally fails to bring technical and value
judgments together in policy recommendations. Along the way, EPA's
original motivation to include pollution-preventing alternatives,
economics of environmental policy and merging of problems and
solutions has not been sustained, and EPA's approach is not solving the
problems it set for itself. When so many individuals have obviously
contributed so much time and worked so hard to develop these reports,
it may seem churlish to press methodological issues.
Still, the question has to be raised: To what extent may
methodological failings make difficult work less efficient and contain
less clear purpose than possible - and ultimately be less effective than
it could be in influencing environmental policy? Perhaps consider
another approach would fare better.
Ranking Problem Solutions
Benefit represents not only the size of a problem addressed, but also
the difference between pursuing specific remedial action and not doing
so. The idea behind ranking solutions is to compare benefits expected
from, e.g., a remediation project, to that achieved by not doing it.
Assume for the purpose of argument that we know how to define
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"project benefit" meaningfully, to incorporate whatever multiple value
considerations are deemed relevant, such as reducing health risk,
environmental risk and adverse socioeconomic impacts. Then the
ranking is defined by estimating the total benefit of the project (e.g.,
site remediation) and dividing this value by project costs; that is the
benefit-to-cost measure. Note that this doesn't integrate risks, as in
comparative risk, but rather reduced risks, or benefits, from solutions.
A key confusion in comparative risk surrounds the role and meaning
for "integration." While it's difficult to meaningfully integrate a set of
diverse risks without reference to risk reduction, if we value the
elimination of risk, such values, as shown above, can be integrated.
Table 110 ranks, according to benefit-to-cost ratio, with benefits
expressed in dollars, 11 site studies or cleanup actions administered by
a large U.S. regional program. The largest benefit-cost project is at the
top, the smallest at the bottom. An illustrative, though overly crude use
of such a ranking, is to simply "draw a budget line" where cumulative
costs are just less than budget, assuming perhaps artificially that your
only choices to conduct or delay these activities: Given resources, you
would fund the projects above the point at which cumulative costs do
not exceed a given budget and delay, or not fund, projects below the
line. Depending on context, you might also argue that the proposed
budget excludes worthwhile projects and that it should be increased.
10 The benefits and costs in Table 1 are expressed in $M. The benefit for conducting
site studies, for which risk is left unchanged, is based on a "value-of-information"
calculation representing the expected cost or risk reduction attributable to the study.
The relevant value weights are derivable from the health, ecological and groundwater
categories; no additional value weight is used. For value-of-in formation, see Robert
Clemen, Making Hard Decisions 339 ff (1991); for a policy discussion, see Jeffrey
Harris, Environmental Policy Making: Act Now or Wait for More Information? in
National Research Council, Valuing Health Risks, Costs, and Benefits for
Environmental Decision Making 107 (1990).
11 The data shown are for a pilot project conducted during 1994. Project data, the
model structure and value weights are yet to be reviewed and made public. Since a
motivation for the approach presented is that the whole ranking is entirely open and
revisable, data errors or inconsistencies in value judgments are not here an issue,
though obviously they should be dealt with.
For a summary of a similar system for evaluating environmental restoration
projects for the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons complex, see National
Research Council, Ranking Hazardous Waste Sites for Remedial Action ch. 6 (1994)
and Office of Technology Assessment, Complex Cleanup: The Environmental Legacy
of Nuclear Weapons Production 60 ff (199 1).
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Table 1
Example of Prioritized List of Projects
(Site Studies and Cleanups)
project Project Health 6- Ecological Value of Socio- Total Project BIC Cumulative Cumulative
# Description Safety & GW Uncertainty Economic Benefit Cost Ratio Costs Benefits
Benefit Benefit Reduction Benefit
I Cleanup 1.06 1.6 0.1 2.8 0.3 11.0 0.3 2.8
--. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ..
2 Site Study 1.9 8.6 10.5 1.2 8.4 1.5 13.3
. Cenu 0.004 0.2 1.0 1.1 0.2 5.1 1.7 -- 14.4
4 Cleanup 0.05 2.1 0.1 2.3 0.5 4.3 2.2 16.7
5 Site Study 0.8 0.3 1.1 0.3 4.3 2.5 17.8
6 _Cleanu 1.0 1.0 0.3 3.7 2.8 18.8
7 Cleanup 0.02---------------. 3.1 3.1. 1.0 3.1 3.8 21.9
8 Site Study 1.0 2.1 3.1 1.1 3.0 4.8 25.0
Cleanup 0.002 0.7 1.6 2.4 0.6 2.6 5.4 26.7
10 Site Study 0.2 1.0 1.2 0.5 2.3 6.0 27.9
11 Site Study 1.0 0.4 1.5 0.9 1.6 6.9 29.3
12 Site Study 0.003 7.7 7.7 5.1 1.5 12.0 37.0
1if *Site Study 79.3 79.3 53.0 1.5 65.0 116.4
14 Cleanup - 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.3 65.7 117.3- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - -- - -- -- - - - - -- - - - -
15 Site Study 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.6 1.2 66.3 118.0
16 Cleanup 0.03 1.3 1.3 1.4 0.9 67.7 119.3
17 Cleanup 0.25 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.7 68.7 120.0
18St~uy0.004 2.0 2.0 3.9 0.5 72.6 122.018 s S tu .--------------- . .. . ................. - - -.... --------
19 Site Study 1.3 1.1 2.4 4.6 0.5 77.2 124.4
20 Cleanup 0.04 1.9 1.9 4.0 0.5 81.2 126.3
21 Cleanup 0.004 1.3 2.1 3.4 7.9 0.4 89.1 129.7
22 Site Study 1.5 1.5 4.9 0.3 94.0 131.2
23 Site Study 1.1 1.1 4.2 0.3 98.2 132.324 Cleanup 0.07 2.0 2.1 82.8 0.02 181.0 134.3
25_Site Study 1.2 0.2 8.9 _ 0.02 189.9 134.5
26 Site Study 0.1 0.1 4.0 0.02 193.9 134.6
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Figure 1 shows projects taken in priority order from left to right,
each contributing its incremental benefit on the Y-axis and its
incremental cost on the X-axis. The curve shows the distribution, over
projects, of potential total benefits versus cumulative total costs. All else
being equal, this analysis implies that you maximize total benefit with a
constrained budget by conducting projects from left-to-right (or "top-
down" in Table 1) in priority order. Projects at the lower-left in
Figure 1 are high-benefit-to-cost and might be funded first from the
budget at issue, all else being equal; the high-benefit-and-high-cost
project at (a) may be valuable, but its scale may cause difficulties with
respect to more typical smaller endeavors. At the upper right, (b) is a
relatively low-benefit-and high-cost project which you might want to
delay or not funding at all.
One can also simply invent new options and see how they rank.
Thus, you might come up with lower-cost alternatives to (b), such as
site studies or cleanups based on the most realistic (as opposed to
conservative) future land use assumptions, as long discussed by EPA
and others. In this way, the ranking is used to interrogate risks and the
6 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 333 [Fall 1995]
projects addressing them, but no conclusions follow mechanically.
Basically, you try to identify projects or project options that, ceteris
paribus, are most worthwhile, the factors responsible - defensibly and
openly. It is important that ranking is relative and comparative, not
absolute. You might well want to argue for the importance of funding
all projects, depending on resources (e.g., historically underfunded or
historically inflated), the nature of the projects (e.g., wetland
restorations vs. hazardous waste sites) and the overall purpose of
priority-setting (e.g., reallocating resources from clean ups to
prevention). Priority-setting is not synonymous with triage. 12
Because project costs, by no means certain, are typically least
controversial in project rankings, the key to this approach is defining
project benefit with multiple value outcomes. Given that you have a
meaningful measure of multiple-value benefit, the remainder of the
analysis for ranking solutions is relatively straightforward, as shown
here. Next, we examine briefly how a multiple-values benefit model is
developed using the methods of multiattribute utility theory, the
foundation of the approach.
Value Modeling Using Multiattribute Utility Theory
Multiattribute utility theory (MUA) is an axiomatized
mathematical framework for analyzing choices involving multiple
competing outcomes. 13 Briefly, multiattribute utility theory is
formalized using four fundamental ideas.
12 It is tempting to use a B/C ratio such as 1 as a cutoff point based on the
argument that, if the B/C is less than 1, the marginal return is less than your marginal
investment. That may be reasonable if the benefit measure is "well-calibrated," but
that assumption is difficult to justify in practice given the approximate nature of
inputs. Generally it is best to assume that rankings are relatively consistent but that
benefits may need to be benchmarked against standards external to the analysis. On
program expenditures and health risk reduction, see, e.g., John D. Graham & James
W. Vaupel, Value of a Life: What Difference Does It Make? 1 Risk Anal. 89 (1981).
13 See Detlof von Winterfeldt & Ward Edwards, Decision Analysis and Behavioral
Research (1986); Ralph L. Keeney, Value-Focused Thinking (1992). For a discussion
of MUA and ranking solutions, see M. Granger Morgan, Quantitative Risk Ranking:
More Promise Than the Critics Suggest, 133 in Worst Things First? - The Debate
over Risk-Based National Environmental Priorities (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic
Golding, eds. 1994).
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1. A Value or Objectives Hierarchy
Figure 2
Value Hierarchy Associated with Prioritized Projects of Table 1
Project Benefit
Human Health Environmental Uncertainty Reduction Socio-Economric
& Safety Risk Risk Reduction Information Collection - Political Impacts
Reduction
Severity of T f p Community
Impact Ecologicall Uncertainty Resources
Resource
Likelihood Impact Remediation Public/Political
Severity Cost Uncertainty Concern
Population Size Extent Uncertainty
ReductionI nsi Groundwater I~Effectiveness
A value (or objectives) hierarchy organizes matters of interest, such
as minimizing ecological risk, minimizing health risk, minimizing
various socioeconomic impacts, costs, etc. A value is, e.g., "health risk,"
measured appropriately; its associated objective is "minimize health
risk." An example of such a value hierarchy, defining the project
rankings listed in Table 1, is shown in Figure 2.14 The value categories
include human health and safety risk, ecological risk, groundwater
contamination, community resource property transfer, public and
political concern, and environmental equity.
2. Measurement Scales and Utility Functions
Individual measurement scales are used to evaluate how well a
specific alternative (e.g., a removal action or characterization study) is
expected to perform on a single objective. Such scales might use formal
risk assessments, professional judgments of experts, consensus
judgments of a citizen panel or some mixture of these. 15 In the
14 Inputs used to calculate benefits in distinct categories are shown in light-border
boxes. Some benefit categories use just one input (e.g., groundwater) while others
(health, ecological, uncertainty reduction) use multiple inputs. Note that without an
explicit calculation for uncertainty reduction, site studies might receive no benefit.
15 On public participation and MUA, see Ralph L. Keeney, Detlof von Winterfeldt
& Thomas Eppel, Eliciting Public Values for Complex Policy Decisions, 36
Management Sd. 1011 (1990).
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example given, formal health risk assessments were used when available,
while ecological impact, impacts on community resources (basically
property transfer) and other inputs were judged by managers familiar
with sites and the projects being conducted using detailed scales
appropriate for the sites and projects evaluated. 16 Measurement scales
are also used to define "single-attribute utility functions" representing
the desirability of an alternative with respect to a single objective; these
functions provide the first step in translating technical inputs into value-
laden scores that will in turn be combined in a single measure of
multiattribute utility or benefit.
3. Value or Policy Weights
Value or policy weights are associated with each distinct value,
representing the relative tradeoffs one is willing to make, in the decision
context, between different outcomes. A set of weights associated with
the hierarchy, expressed in program dollars, is shown below in
Table 2.17
16 An example of a measurement scale is provided below in Table 3.
17 The value weights below were neither internally nor externally reviewed and
would likely be revised after such a process. Comments in Table 2 indicate how the
weights andmodel structure might change depending on stakeholder views.
Definitions were provided for "poor," "marginal,' "median," "good" and
::protected" habitats by participating ecotoxicologists. For example, the definition of
"median" is:
Habitat which while suboptimal, may be expected to support native
species, or commercially important species, in addition to species which
are proposed, recommended, or under review for State or Federal listing
as rare, threatened or endangered, or which are State species of special
concern. Areas utilized or potentially utilized by wildlife, including but
not limited to sanctuaries, preserves, easements, wildlife rehabilitation
center, or game management areas.
For environmental equity, the instructions read:
Will members of a disadvantaged ethnic, racial, or socioeconomic group
potentially be affected by the proposed activity in terms ol
environmental equity. Environmental inequity refers to the
disproportionate aistribution of health or environmental risks to
disadvantaged groups, or to intentional or unintentional biases in how
risks to such groups have been addressed. Environmental equity depends
significantly Both on local demographics, the history of government and
other official actions, and comparable patterns elsewhere.
This definition was intended largely as a place-holder for a better
characterization; the modularity of the MUA model makes such submodeling tasks
manageable. Land use decisions, typically associated with many equity disputes, were
also not within the scope of the program sponsoring development of the model.
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Table 2
Value Weights Associated with Rankings and Value Hierarchy in Table 1 & Fig. 1
Value Relative Value
Category (in Program $) Summary Meaning and Comments
Human $5M Relative value of averting one "most serious" (e.g.,
Health & premature cancer) statistical health impact. This
Safety category is not intended to apply to any imminent,
non-statistical impacts. The same value weight is
used for worker and public impacts, but worker
impacts attributable to remediation were not
included in estimates.
Ecological $2.6M Relative value of avoiding destruction of ten acres
of "median" ecological habitat.
Groundwater $1.8M Relative value of avoiding contamination of
groundwater resource associated with site. Does not
reflect either extent or quality of resource.
Community $950K Relative value of making available an average site
Resources intended to be developed for commercial or
residential use. Deliberately not scaled by acreage
or other dimensions to represent program
indifference regarding the importance of different
development projects.
Environmental $950K Relative value of completing a project judged to
Equity contribute to environmental equity. This input
should be scored simultaneously for all projects as it
is poorly judged by individuals familiar only with
single sites. In addition, the definition of equity
used here is fairly simple, and likely could be
supplemented by some more meaningful empirical
criteria. The value weight is not intended to reflect
increased health or environmental risk associated
with a site, as those impacts should be estimated in
the health or environmental risk scores.
Public or $600K Relative value of eliminating highest level of
Political concern as represented on this measurement scale.
Concern The case can be made that if community resource
property transfer and environmental equity are the
ey reasons for public or political concern, and if
these benefits are appropriately valued elsewhere in
the model, then the value weight for this category
should be zero or very small.
The value weights mean, for example, that the relative value of
spending program or public funds is about $5M to avert a "most
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serious" statistical health impact and $2.6M to avert destruction of 10
acres of "median" ecological habitat, both as defined in the model's
measurement scales. Benefit may be expressed in terms of any value
considered in the model, or an artificial numeraire of "utiles," just as
currencies may be translated using exchange rates.
4. An Aggregation Function
Finally, an aggregation function combines the value weights with
the several technical "scores" provided via the measurement scales (and
the set of single-attribute utility functions) to provide an overall
measure of benefit for each project or activity evaluated.
Summary
The four concepts above form a necessary set of conceptual tools
one would wish to have available when embarking on a comparative-
ranking project, whether of problems or solutions. Although the formal
mathematics will not be provided here for the sake of brevity, the
model uses nothing more complicated than high-school algebra and
basic probability, and it can be efficiently implemented in a common
garden-variety spreadsheet. Multiattribute utility theory also includes
methods for the assessment of value weights, rules for structuring value
hierarchies, rules for defining measurement scales and rules for defining
meaningful aggregation functions.
The purpose of multiattribute theory is to explain the four concepts
in detail and to describe just how one proceeds to combine value-laden
policy judgments with technical inputs in a comparative ranking of
proposed actions. In particular, the theory tells you how to structure a
value hierarchy so that your aggregation function takes on a relatively
simple form, such as a linear combination of value-weighted scores on
individual measurement scales. [Theorems on value hierarchies are
typically of the form: Preferences involving value hierarchy, H, have
property, P, involving preferences (with or without uncertainty).
Aggregation function fH using weights w1 , ... , w. has convenient
property Fp, e.g., linear, multilinear or multiplicative.] 18 The theory
also makes clear just where value judgments and technical judgments
18 For details, see Decision Analysis and Behavioral Research. supra note 13, ch. 9.
Comparative risk typically assumes linear aggregation, whether justified.
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link up, what the desirable properties are of individual measurement
scales and indeed what is meant by a measurement scale.
One of the most valuable distinctions in multiattribute utility
theory, for example, is that of means versus end objectives. If, for
example, you want to use pesticide toxicity as a measure of ecological
hazard, recognizing that it may not also adequately represent ecological
risk because neither exposure nor population size is considered. Then,
you do not want to place a value weight on toxicity, because, strictly
speaking, nobody cares how toxic anything is except insofar as it is a
proxy for some valued outcome, e.g., ecological damage. In
multiattribute utility theory, toxicity is called a "means" objective since
reducing toxicity is a means to reduce what you care about, namely
ecological risk. So the correct way to develop a model is to include
ecological risk as the end objective, and recognize that you only have a
proxy measurement for it. Yet, the mistake should be avoided of
attaching a value weight directly to a toxicity level. 19 The problem
with comparative risk and some other approaches to comparative
ranking is that there is no such theory guiding their development which
can avoid problems of this type.20
The value weights of multiattribute utility theory also have a clear
meaning, as illustrated in Table 2. While some people may be repulsed
by the idea of monetized tradeoffs, or tradeoffs of any kind, they
should first realize that the approach here differs from traditional cost-
benefit analysis in that all values are included in the definition of
benefit, and that the policy weights are defined in terms of actions or
choices involving the public budgets individuals wish to influence -
19 SeeValue-Focused Thinking, supra note 13, ch. 4 on proxy measures. Attempts
to rank pesticides could be improved through a clearer treatment of proxy measures,
such LC50 toxicity values; see Leon Higley & Wendy Wintersteen, A Novel
Approach to Environmental Risk Assessment of Pesticides as a Basis for
Incorporating Environmental Costs into Economic Injury Levels, American
Entomologist, Spring 1992, at 34.
20 Another problem avoided in MUA and repeated in comparative risk is that of
double-counting impacts. "Toxic pesticides" fr example, may be considered as a
human health and an ecological problem: so is it one problem or two? If the health
impacts occur to the public and farmworkers, is that two health problems or one? The
category of "problems," separated from alternatives intended to address them, leads
inevitably to confusions of this type. The Colorado comparative risk report reports the
problem of double-counting on its summary page; see Colorado Environment 2000 3
(State of Colorado) (1989).
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not what is "valued" by the marketplace. 2 1 Value weights are explicitly
and willfully adopted by a decision-making or stakeholder group
through deliberation and debate; they are not the output of a survey or
econometric model. The practical advantages of such an explicitly
constructive approach to defining value over so-called contingent
valuation approaches to benefits assessment have also been investigated
by Fischhoff, Slovic and others. 2 2 In this case, and in many other
environmental policy contexts, such values represent a relative
willingness-to-pay in program or public dollars and can be easily
changed to show the differences, if any, that different value judgments
make to the rankings or particular funding decisions.2 3
For example, if you consider that the value weight on ecological
impacts is too low, the weight can be changed and rankings compared
for differences. 'While it may be difficult to articulate such judgments,
they are nonetheless implicit in the decisions being made about the
environment by all of us, all the time;24 the multiattribute process,
unlike comparative risk, simply makes them systematic and open to
view by all concerned. 2 5 The approach says simply that given a set of
21 Value modeling as presented here contains both potentially conservative and
progressive elements. A factor leading to conservatism is to neglect or mis-model
synergistic or cumulative effect's by evaluating single projects. Another problem is not
recognizing the comparative aspect of rankings: Depending on context, even a
bottom-ranked activity may be worth conducting. Progressive aspects of value-
modeling are that it promotes meaningful discourse (What is environmental justice?
What is an ecological impact?), makes that discourse open (in contrast to solving
problems behind dosed doors or in court) and requires confrontations (e.g., between
economics and the environment) too often conveniently avoided by public agencies.
22 See Robin Gregory, Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, Valuing Environmental
Resources: A Constructive Approach, 7 J. Risk & Uncertainty 177 (1993); Baruch
Fischhoff, Value Elicitation: Is There Anything In There? 45 Am. Psychologist, 835
(1991); Baruch Fischhoff & Lita Furby, Measuring Values: A ConceptualFramework for Interpreting Transactions with Special Reference to Contingent
Valuation of Vuibility, 1 J Risk & Uncertainty 147 (1988). For an example of how
the media frame the assessment issue toward an economic-only paradigm for value,
see Polls May Help Government Decide the Worth of Nature, New York Times,
Sept. 6, 1993, at 1.
23 On sensitivity analysis, see Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality,
186-187 (1991); Decision Analysis and Behavioral Research supra note 13, ch. 11.
24 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in Valuing the Earth 127,
130 (Herman Daly & Kenneth Townsend, eds. 1993); Milton Russell, The Making
of Cruel Choices, in Valuing Health Risks, Costs, and Benefits for Environmental
Decision Makin& supra note 10, at 15.
25 See supra note 17 on the "public values forum," which lawyers of some stripes
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inputs and assumptions about relative importance, here is a nominal set
of priorities. If you don't believe these priorities, we should be able to
identify what aspect of the inputs - either technical or value-laden
judgments - is the source of disagreement and proceed from there. A
benefits model of this kind therefore is not to be used as a decision-
maker substitute, but as an aid to dialogue and judgment; it is dynamic
and open to change through the articulation and use of its measurement
scales and value weights.
Basically, multiattribute utility theory provides a rigorous and
consistent solution to the problems of defining and structuring values,
defining measures, creating integrated rankings with competing values
and incorporating project costs. The multiattribute approach to value-
modeling is not as well-known as it should be; it is not perfect, but it is
the most rigorous and best understood approach to modeling tradeoffs
involving multiple outcomes. Uncertainty may be incorporated as well,
but the greater motivation is that the key drivers of many
environmental decisions are competing values rather than (or in
addition to) uncertainties, and these values need to be articulated and
made explicit. Following are some other issues associated with applying
multiattribute utility theory that resolve continuing problems found in
the applications of comparative risk.
Identijing Value Judgments
There are two main types of value judgments in multiattribute
utility theory. First, a measurement scale for a single value category,
such as health impacts, or ecological impacts, will itself have embedded
in it value judgments. For example, if we estimate the number of acute
fatalities, chronic fatalities (e.g., due to cancer) and minor injuries
(made precise in whatever way) attributable to some problem, say a
hazardous waste site, then, all these impacts are either valued the same,
or, more likely, differently. Differences are reflected in the single-
attribute utility functions mentioned above, that represent value
tradeoffs "within" a single category of value. Similarly, different
ecological or socioeconomic impacts may be valued differently, but
before such impacts are compared to others, such as health or
socioeconomic. Basically, even if you only have one category of value,
may find unappealing for its open and non-adversarial approach to articulating values.
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value judgments still relate to various types of outcomes within it. Yet,
while there are no value-free measurement scales, where a value appears
on a given scale is essentially a technical or "expert" judgment.
The second type of value judgment is represented by the relative
tradeoffs or weights between distinct values, as shown in Table 2. While
value judgments of the first type might be provided by a group of
subject-matter experts, such as ecologists for environmental impacts,
those of the second type might come from broader stakeholder groups.
These two types are implicitly sorted out fairly well in at least some
comparative risk projects; but life would be simpler knowing that
there's a rigorous framework that has dealt with the issue already. Also,
neither type of value judgments is called "importance," a term used
repeatedly in comparative risk projects that confounds the following: A
problem is important because we need to act immediately; great
uncertainty is associated with it; the problem has been long neglected in
the past (e.g., ecological impacts); it is the biggest problem; it will be
the most costly future problem; we do not know how to solve it; or
there are inequities in addressing it. The casual use of "importance"
allows all those meanings to be assumed at one time or another
without pinning down the intended meaning.2 6 "Importance" is a
holistic term for almost any factor entering into a comparative ranking
and a project participant evaluating an "importance" takes on too great
a cognitive burden in the absence of a structured and logical method.
"Importance" is just a bad heuristic tool in the complex context of
comparatively ranking either problems or solutions.
Codiing Judgment
Any comparative risk report, or almost any application of
multiattribute utility theory, shows overwhelmingly a tendency to
systematize expert judgment, whoever the "experts" may be.27
26 On the difference between "importance" and value weights, see Value-Focused
Thinking, supra note 11, at 147-148 (the section title& "The Most Common
Critical Mistake"); see also Reducing Risk, supra note 2, at 17 and Environment
1991 supra note 4, at 15.
27 On the provisional status of "experts," see Improving Risk Communication,
supra note 9, at 270-271.
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Table 3
Severity of Potential Ecological Impact Constructed Scale
1 No or negligible threat to resources. Exposure to the hazard source will
produce no ecological effects of concern.
2 Low threat to resources. Impacts are self-correcting or of minor ecological
concern, as supported by observations or knowledge of conditions similar to
the following:
- The number of species' members killed from acute or chronic impacts
are expected to fall within the range of normal temporal or spatial
variations.
- No significant long-term adverse effects on species health are expected
to occur, such as maladaptive changes in birth weight, mature size, life
span, biological integrity or reproductive success.
- The carrying capacity, biological diversity, ecological sustainability or
abundance associated with the resource are not expected to be
permanently affected at significant levels.
* The likelihood that expected changes can be mitigated by human
intervention is very high.
3 Moderate threat to resources. Imp acts are not self-correcting and are of some
ecological concern, as supported by observations or knowle of conditions
similar to the following:
- The number of species' members killed from acute or chronic impacts
may fall near the limits of normal temporal or spatial variations.
* Isolated long-term adverse effects on species health may occur, such as
maladaptive changes in birth weight, mature size, life span, biological
integrity or reproductive success.
* The carrying capacity, biological diversity, ecological sustainability or
abundance associated with the resource may be threatened.
* The likelihood that expected changes can be mitigated by human
intervention is small.
........................................................................................
4 High threat to resources. Impacts are not self-correcting and are of clear
ecological concern, as supported by observations or knowledge of conditions
similar to the following:
. The number of species' members killed from acute or chronic impacts
may fall outside the limits of normal temporal or spatial variations.
• Widespread long-term adverse effects on species health may occur, such
as maladaptive changes in birth weight, mature size, life span, biological
integrity or reproductive success.
* The carrying capacity, biological diversity, ecological sustainability or
abundance associated with the resource may be significantly and
permanently lowered or damaged.
I The expected changes cannot be mitigated by human intervention.
Ecological risks and socioeconomic impacts often depend for their
evaluation on some individual's or group's best judgment, as no model
or systematized data may exist. How then, for example, should the so-
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called Technical Review Groups (TRGs) found in the comparative risk
project process develop useful measurement scales when it is known that
no formal risk assessment will be available?
Here too, considerable groundwork has been laid in multiattribute
utility theory, especially through the notion of a constructed scale.2 8
Table 329 shows such a constructed scale, used as one of the inputs to
score ecological impacts for the model presented already. Bullet items
in the scale indicate several non-exclusive ways of providing a score--the
idea being that the "experts" select the scores that best fit their
knowledge of the site and its environmental condition, both "with" and
"without" conducting a specific project. Those who complain that such
a measurement scale is not quantitative enough should provide a
substitute. Meanwhile, constructed scales provide means to represent
the best knowledge appropriate to the ranking task, whatever it may be.
Constructed scales are eminently suited to public participation, as they
force on participants an improved clarity and explicitness about "risk,"
while keeping all inputs in public view. Comparative risk projects
contain many scales of varying quality, but again, appear to have been
developed without support of an existing body of relevant knowledge.
In the multiattribute approach, unlike comparative risk, the goal of
providing a complete "audit trail" back to technical inputs based on
constructed or other measures is fully possible.
Distinguishing Alternatives and Values
Decision analysis is a normative theory involving three concepts:
uncertainty regarding what you know or don't know, values associated
28 On constructed scales, see Value-Focused Thinking, supra note 13, ch. 4. For
other examples, see Miley W. Merkhofer & Ralph L. Keeney, A Multiattribute
Utility Analysis of Alternative Sites for the Disposal of Nuclear Waste, 7 RiskAnal.
173(1987).
29 Note that in Table 3 "Low threat," for example, is implicitly defined by the
detail following and "1-4" have no meaning in themselves. Such labels must be
translated by the underlying multiattribute model into a meaningful risk calculation
(making intermediate scores such as "1.5" acceptable); hence a "1" on this scale has no
necessary relation to a "1" on any other scale. A common mistake in many ranking
models is calculating with labels, such as using the 1-4 scale here to define arbitrary
"points." But what if you change to five points, or three? How do you control your
results? Note that while the judgment being asked for here is not trivial, it is one of
several of a minimal set of questions one would likely want to ask when many millions
of project dollars are at stake.
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with outcomes of interest (the topic of this paper) and the options or
alternatives from which you must choose. Environmental justice is a
value and economic impacts refers to one; pollution prevention,
education and risk communication refer to alternatives; reduction of
consumption levels is also an alternative.
Neither environmental justice nor pollution prevention need to be
elevated to "alternative risk paradigms," as appears in some comparative
risk literature. 3 0 This serves only to further obfuscate and marginalize
the roles of these important and interesting ideas. How one should
value environmental justice and how one should measure it are
difficult indeed; but there is no problem about just what its role can be
in a comparative analysis. Or, to cite again the Vermont project, the
authors banished "overconsumption of Vermont's natural resources" to
"non-problem" status, apparently because its bona fides as an
environmental "problem" could not be agreed upon. Insofar as a
comparative risk project is intended to clarify public perceptions, the
role of reduced consumption, as perhaps the only significant alternative
left to Vermonters as a means of reducing their environmental
problems, is thus unclear and poorly communicated by the project. Yet
there should be no mystery here; "reduction of Vermont's overall
consumption levels" is a decision alternative, a choice or an action, pure
and simple. Similarly, new alternatives may be created easily for an
analysis as well, such as considering site cleanups based on different
land use standards or focused site studies. This philosophy of "value-
focused thinking,"3 1 leads stakeholders to "work backwards" from the
values of interest to new alternatives going beyond the status quo. Such
thinking appears to have been part of EPA's original conception of
comparative risk, but is largely missing from its current formulation.
A Limitation
A natural question is whether one can "integrate" two or more
distinct sets of value weights. For example, one might want to assess the
30 Some of the pseudo-controversial issues raised in the California report by the
Environmental Justice Committee and Economic Perspective Committee could be
addressed through a multiple-values, ranking-solutions approach even without a fully-
fledged MUA model; see, e.ag Toward the 21st Century- Planning for the Protection
of California's Environment (State of California) (1994) at 233-384.
31 See Value-Focused Thinking, supra note 13.
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value weights through a survey or a vote, in order to define the values of
a community or stakeholder group. A famous theorem proved by
Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow says that generally can't be done.3 2
Unless everyone already agrees on the same set of values, a putative
aggregation or integration procedure for value weights will generally
violate some reasonable condition that you'd like the aggregation to
have, such as being "non-dictatorial," or not being determined by any
one person's values. Arrow formulated his theorem in the context of
voting rules, but it applies quite readily to multiattribute value weights:
any set of weights must represent either the values of a single decision
maker or the consensus values of a group, but such a consensus must
typically be arrived at through the usual political and social means;
there is no mathematical trick to aggregate values. Nonetheless,
multiattribute utility theory provides a clear conception of the
relationships among "pure" technical judgments, value-laden technical
judgments codified in measurement scales, tradeoffs among competing
objectives - and an "exogenous" political, social or institutional process
required to arrive at the value weights appropriate for a given decision-
making context. Properly applied, the approach shows just where your
values lie and where they come from.
Why Hasn't Value-Modeling Been Used In Comparative Risk?
First, multiattribute models can be complex. An "off-the'shelf"
approach - that comparative risk projects sometimes appear to adopt
- usually fails, and, because multiattribute utility theory forces all the
right questions, models may become overly detailed. However, that is a
matter of streamlining and knowing where to stop an analysis; any
approach will have to balance accuracy, time and resources. At the same
time, the decisions are often complex, include many options, reflect
many concerns and may involve stakes on the order of $100M-$1B -
perhaps annually; so a simple priority-setting model may not be useful.
The second reason even informal value-modeling may have been
heretofore ignored is that the current formulation of comparative risk
fits in well with EPA's attempts to replace the value-laden policy
questions with quasi-technical or "scientific" solutions. As EPA has, in
32 See Ralph L. Keeney & Howard Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives 523
ff (1993) and Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (2d ed. 1963).
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the past, attempted to define levels of acceptable risk through science
alone, comparative risk "asks the wrong question" 3 3 of ranking
problems only or of trying to "integrate risks," whereas a
methodologically sound approach ranks solutions with explicitly valued
benefits. Environmental issues and methodologies to address them are
inextricably linked, and EPA's scientistic approach serves to limit, in
advance, its influence.
A brief comparison may again indicate the extent to which
comparative risk crystallizes EPA's methodological value judgment of
trying to make policy by "scientific" proxies. For many years, it tried to
value risks or risk reduction through methods developed by economists
known as "contingent valuation," as has been eschewed in comparative
risk.34 Contingent valuation represents many approaches, but the
central idea is that some pre-existing value is held by individuals for,
say, natural resources or risk reduction; the purpose of a contingent
valuation survey is to accurately estimate it. But in applications of
multiattribute utility theory, values are not presumed to exist a priori.
They may need to be articulated and explicitly constructed through
public participation, risk communication or other such interventions -
including comparative risk projects. A good deal of the heuristic power
found in multiattribute utility theory comes from its role in helping to
define and re-define problems, - by respecifying value categories,
introducing new value categories, defining measurement criteria or
introducing new risk reduction alternatives. That heuristic power,
absent in comparative risk, has been termed the constructive aspect of
the multiattribute process, in the sense that values, measures,
alternatives, problems and solutions are considered to be as much
"made" as "found" by participants in a multiattribute ranking.
This constructive content is part of the appeal of the multiattribute
process for those interested in democratizing environmental policy
debates. But the idea of constructed values, or constructed preferences,
is antithetical to any approach, such as contingent valuation, which
33 See Marc K. Landy, Marc J. Roberts, and Stephen R. Thomas, The
Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions (1990).
34 See Reducing Risk, supra note 2, at 25; Environment 1991, supra note 4, at 14.
On contingent valuation, see Robert C. Mitchell & Richard T. Carson, Using
Surveys to Value Public Goods: The Contingent Valuation Method (1989).
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assumes that values exist largely independently of the interventions of
an assessor. In multiattribute applications, there is often only a form of
analytic participant-description, through which values come to be
represented in a formal model. Any complex risk ranking will require
the combination of normative and descriptive methods, but
multiattribute theory is simply open about that fact. Aside from its
normative attractiveness, the constructive perspective has empirical
support as well. One of the conclusions of cognitive research on
contingent valuation techniques is that answers given to simple
preference questions provided in different formats (direct assessment
versus tradeoff, gambles versus certain choices, etc.) can fluctuate
wildly: they are very sensitive to subtleties in how valuation questions
are posed.35 The answer provided by MUA is not to substitute a single
new question, but rather a whole process of interaction, thinking and
dialogue, through which values are expressed in improved languages of
risk. So though comparative risk has not taken up the methods of
contingent valuation, insofar as the problems and solutions of
comparative risk lack a true constructive dimension, comparative risk
will never be the type of flexible, open-ended process needed for
legitimate public participation and useful policy; it will still be asking
the wrong questions by not moving forward from the problem of
ranking problems.
Science Begins and Ends with Problems
A mathematical science of value exists, but it is yet to be taken up
by EPA, perhaps because it also leads away from science, if with clarity
and method. Nor will ranking solutions using multiattribute utility
theory solve all priority-setting problems. It helps considerably, but here
are two examples to show that multiattribute or decision-analytic
approaches also present important problems.
Incentives
Assume one had shown the limited value of a low-ranking project,
but that resources potentially saved by not conducting were to be
unavailable to stakeholders in any meaningful way. Would they have an
interest in implementing it? Probably not; it's possible that any
35 See supra note 22.
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diversion of funds could be interpreted as a political loss if nothing
differentiates that from a budget cut. For rankings to be acted upon
with true self-interest, priority setting should be combined with a
proper incentive structure, say ear-marking saved funds for more
desirable environmental protection. Such incentive schemes do not
follow obviously from MUA; they must be developed and
implemented in addition to a ranking model.
Mission-Driven Budgeting
How should we implement priorities? You can't just tell project
managers, for example, to "Stop Project A and Start Project B;" that's
centralized and dogmatic management at its worst. No approach can
succeed without detailed coordination of policy-makers, stakeholders
and those "in the trenches" conducting environmental work.
But the multiattribute approach is exactly that of "mission-driven
budgeting" of the type needed to reinvent government. 3 6 That is,
multiattribute utility analysis will link a program or organization's
environmental, social and budgetary "mission objectives" to detailed
line activities in the context of government and stakeholder interests.
And this mission-based, "reinventing" approach is equally useful for
environmental groups, regulatory agencies or industrial concerns. It
doesn't matter who you are: There is a basis for communication and the
improvement of environmental decision quality over time. The process
consists of developing a value hierarchy with stakeholders, measurement
scales with experts, sets of value weights with decision-makers and
stakeholders, and inputs to score or rank alternatives, as well as
evaluating the quality of inputs and seeing what it all implies. Perhaps
surprisingly, while formal multiattribute utility theory can be 90%
defining the problem and 10% the answer; the primary benefit often
lies in improved understanding and communication.
36 On mission-based budgeting, see David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, Reinventing
Government ch. 4-5 (1993). An important consideration is the difference between
measurement of mission objectives through a MUA model and a program's or
business's performance measurement via, e.g., the number of hazardous waste sites
cleaned up per year, resources expended per site or number of permits issued with
pollution-prevention clauses. Performance and mission measures are related, but they
are far from identical and are implemented quite differently.
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Conclusion
Tools derived from multiattribute utility and decision analysis
rigorously and methodically address issues posed by comparative risk.
They should be considered as means to help define processes, methods
and outputs of comparative risk projects. If nothing else, the efficiency
and integrity of such projects may be improved just by making people
aware of basic vocabulary, concepts and useful techniques. Much is to
be gained by understanding the conceptual framework of
multiattribute theory, even if all of its mathematical techniques are not
implemented. Yet, the problems and contexts for environmental policy
are sufficiently complex that no single approach is going to resolve
them all. Progress is possible only by trying an approach and coming up
with something better. The first steps are to model values, rank
multiple-value solutions, not just problems, and proceed from there.
Again, as the late philosopher of science, Sir Karl Popper, said: "Science
begins and ends with problems." 37
37 See supra note 1.
